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A Place for the Privileged Will*
JACK LEE TSEN-TA
Most people consider the proper distribution of their property
on death a vitally important matter. For those who are elderly,
ill or engaged in risky occupations, it is often urgent to get such
things settled fast. But some people may be in circumstances where
they cannot comply with the formal requirements for a valid
will.1 The law has long recognised this concern in the case of
soldiers and sailors by allowing them to create privileged wills.
Many jurisdictions, including Singapore, have legislation to this
effect. Today, “soldiers being in actual military service” and
“mariners or seamen at sea” can make privileged wills using any
form of written or oral words, provided that they are a deliberate
expression of the testator’s wishes and are intended to have testa-
mentary effect.2 None of the normal formalities are required.
Jack Lee Tsen-Ta is a third year student, Faculty of Law, National University of
Singapore, Academic Year 1993-94.
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By s 5 of the Wills Act, Cap 352, 1985 Rev Ed, a will must be in writing
and signed by the testator, and such signature must be made or acknow-
ledged as his or hers in the presence of two or more witnesses present at
the same time. The witnesses themselves must sign the will in the presence
of the testator.
In the Estate of Knibbs, Flay v Trueman [1962] 2 All ER 829, [1962] 1 WLR
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However in recent years academics and law reform commissions
from various jurisdictions have called for the abolition of privil-
eged wills.
This article seeks to determine if there remains a place for the
privileged will today. The rationale behind them will be compared
to interpretations placed by courts on modern-day provisions
recognising privileged wills. It will be shown that there is still
a role for the privileged will and that it should be redefined,
not removed.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY3
A. Roman Origins
In early Roman or civil law, rigid formalities and rituals were
required for executing wills, but from the time of Julius Caesar in
the 1st century BC, soldiers and later seamen in naval service were
granted the special privilege of making wills without formalities.4
B. English Law
The Wills Act 1540 (32 Hen VIII c 1) was the first English statute
852 (no requisite intention; deceased’s words assumed that arrangements had
already been made for his sister to receive his entire estate, but they had not).
Testators need not know they are actually making a will, as long as they
intend to give expression to their wishes in the event of death: In the Estate
of Donner [1917] 34 TLR 138 (no requisite intention; deceased’s words merely
affirmed his incorrect belief that his mother would be entitled to his whole
estate if he died intestate); Re Stable, Dalrymple v Campbell [1919] P 7;
In the Estate of Beech [1923] P 46; In the Estate of MacGillivray [1946]
2 All ER 301.
See generally Andrew G Lang, “Privileged will – a dangerous anachronism?”
(1985) 8 Univ of Tas LR 166 at 166-68.
Ibid at 166-67. See also Thomas Collett Sandars, The Institutes of Justinian
(1956) at 178, lib II tit XI (“De Militari Testamento”), who states that the
privilege “dates from the time of Julius Caesar, who granted it as a temporary
concession. It was made a general rule by Nerva, and confirmed by Trajan”.
3
4
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to prescribe formalities for the disposition of real property. Before
this time, succession was governed solely by ecclesiastical law.5
The statute did not extend to wills of personal property; such wills
continued to require no formalities and could be created orally.6
Despite the Wills Act 1540, Henry Swinburne noted in his work
A Brief Treatise of Testaments and Wills that by 1590 privileged
wills were considered part of the law of succession through the
influence of the civil law.7
But the earliest mention of the privileged will in an English Act
came about through the Statute of Frauds 1677 (29 Car II c 3).
The purpose of this statute, according to its preamble, was to pre-
vent “Frauds and Perjuryes” which the informal creation of wills
had led to. The statute laid down procedures applying to most
wills dealing with both real and personal property, in particular
prescribing for the first time various formalities for wills disposing
of personal property worth more than £30. However, s 23 of the
Act made an exception by expressly giving soldiers and sailors
the privilege to continue making valid wills informally:
XXIII. Provided always, That notwithstanding this act, any
soldier being in actual military service, or any mariner or seaman
being at sea, may dispose of his moveables, wages and personal
estate, as he or they might have done before the making of
this act.8
5
6
7
8
For theories on how the law of succession fell under ecclesiastical jurisdiction,
see John Selden’s third tract, “Of the Original of ecclesiastical jurisdictions
of Testaments” in Tracts Written by John Selden (1683) and Thomas Edward
Scrutton, The Influence of the Roman Law on the Law of England (1884,
reprinted 1985) at 166-69.
D C Potter, “Soldier’s wills” (1949) 12 MLR 183 at 183.
See above, n 3 at 167, for a citation of the relevant passage.
8 Statutes at Large at 409. There is some confusion about the correct section.
Statutes at Large gives the relevant provision as s 23, while many authorities
incorrectly state it to be s 22.
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Most authorities trace the privilege to Roman law.9 Sir Leoline
Jenkins, who prepared the relevant part of the Statute of Frauds
1677, mentioned in a preface to his biography that he had obtained
for soldiers of the English army the full benefit of the testament-
ary privileges of the Roman army.10
This provision reappeared in s 11 of the Wills Act 1837 (7 Will
IV and 1 Vict c 26) in the following form:
11. Provided always . . . that any soldier being in actual milit-
ary service, or any mariner or seaman at sea, may dispose of
his personal estate as he might have done before the making
of this Act.
This section is still in force today, extended by the Wills (Soldiers
and Sailors) Act 1918 (c 58) to persons under the age of 21,11
and for the disposition of realty in addition to personalty.12 The
involvement of naval forces in land operations and the advent of
air warfare during World War II (1914-18) also prompted legislators
to extend privileged wills to cover personnel in these situations.13
C. Singapore
The general provision for privileged wills in the English Wills Act
9
10
11
12
13
See Drummond v Parish (1843) 3 Curt 522 at 531, 163 ER 812 at 815;
Godfrey Cole, “How active is actual military service?” [1982] Conv 185 at
185; Martin Davey, “The making and revocation of wills – I” [1980] Conv
64 at 70; F C Hutley, “Privileged wills” (1949) 23 ALJ 118 at 119; see above,
n 3 at 166.
Drummond v Parish, ibid. Contra n 6 at 184: “Today, however, in spite of a
long line of judicial references to the civil law and a tendency among writers
to turn to the Corpus luris as to the original source, we may safely consider
the Roman fallacy to have been exploded.”
Wills (Soldiers and Sailors) Act 1918, s 1.
Ibid, s 3(1).
Ibid, see s 4 and 5(2) respectively. See Terence Prime, “The privileged will in
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1837 was adopted with minor alterations in s 28 of the Indian
Act XXV of 1838. The effect of this Act extended to Singapore,
for during this period it was the Governor-General of India in
Council who was explicitly empowered to legislate for the Straits
Settlements, which included Singapore.14 The Singapore provi-
sion was amended by s 4 of the Wills (Amendment) Ordinance
1938 (Act 21 of 1938) in an identical manner to the UK Wills
(Soldiers and Sailors) Act 1918. It exists today as s 26(1) of the
Wills Act, Cap 352 (1985 Ed):
26(1). Notwithstanding anything in this Act any soldier being
in actual military service, or any mariner or seaman being at
sea, may dispose of his personal estate as he might have done
before the making of this Act and may do so even though under
the age of 21 years.
Section 26(1) has yet to be considered judicially in Singapore,
despite having been on the statute books for more than 150 years.
But since it is identical in all material respects to the correspond-
ing United Kingdom provision, the law in England and Singapore
is probably the same.
II. RATIONALE BEHIND THE LAW
The Roman origin of the privilege provides much insight into the
rationale behind privileged wills.
Mortal danger. During Roman times, the privilege was restricted
to soldiers who were in expeditione (on an expedition), ie living in
camp on actual military service15 after receiving orders to proceed
14
15
the circumstances of contemporary ‘peace’” (1986) 83 Law Society Gazette
2078 at 2078 col 1.
Kevin Tan Yew Lee, “A short legal and constitutional history of Singapore”
in The Singapore Legal System (Walter Woon ed, 1989) at 13.
Sandars, The Institutes of Justinian, see above, n 4 at 175 para 3; see
above, n 3 at 167.
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to the battlefront.16 This was probably because it was only in
such situations that soldiers and sailors were considered to face
mortal danger in the course of their duty, and risked dying before
a formal will could be made.17
Lack of legal advice. Warfare and sea travel involve long periods
of absence from home, and in the past there were no speedy or
reliable means of communication. Most ordinary Roman soldiers
did not know how to create a valid will.18 This meant that during
active duty they were inops consilii (“without advice”) – being
parted from their civil surroundings, they were without readily
available means of consultation and professional advice to properly
execute a will.19 Privileged wills remained important in the 19th
century as conditions of war were not considered conducive for
creating proper wills. Few soldiers then were able to write, and even
fewer had the means to commit a document to anything like safe-
keeping. Soldiers also did not have the opportunity of consulting
friends, or assessing property and deciding the best way to dispose
16
17
18
19
Godfrey Cole, “What is ‘actual military service’?” (1973) 123 NLJ 672 at
673 col 3.
Sherman v Pyke (1724), cited in Drummond v Parish, see above, n 9 at 541,
818: “It must be under actual engagement, attended with danger, otherwise
mounting at Whitehall would be sufficient. . .” In Drummond, a soldier
living in barracks in peacetime was held not to be entitled to the privilege.
See below, n 22 at 195 per Denning LJ. This view was accepted in English
law up to the mid-19th century but declined thereafter. See above, n 6 at
184-85, where Potter attributes this to the replacement of Ecclesiastical
Courts with barristers of the Probate Court in 1857, and a new sympathy
for the “simple soldier”.
Sandars, The Institutes of Justinian, see above, n 4 at 173: “The necessity
for the observance of these formalities in the construction of testaments has
been dispensed with . . . in favour of military persons, on account of their
excessive unskilfulness in such matters.”
Sherman v Pyke, see above, n 17, 3 Curt 522 at 540, 163 ER 812 at 818.
In Re Wingham, see below, n 22 at 195-96 per Denning LJ; Peter Bailey,
“A soldier’s privileged will in Northern Ireland” (1982) 33 NILQ 53 at 56.
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of it by will.20 It is submitted that many of these justifications
for privileged wills remain cogent today.
Reward for selflessness; psychological benefit. Apart from
Roman law, commentators have justified the capacity to make
privileged wills as a reward for engaging in socially beneficial
occupations which involve risk. The privilege also gives testators
a sense of security in knowing that if they die in the course of
duty, arrangements would have been made for their affairs.21
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE LAW
A. Over-Expansive Interpretation
However in the landmark English decision of In re Wingham
(decd), Andrews v Wingham the Court of Appeal refused to in-
quire into the reasons for the privilege. “The privilege is one thing.
The reasons for it are another.”22 In particular, Denning LJ felt
that the English soldier’s military testamentary privilege was not
identical to that of the Roman legionary: “This supposed throw-
back to Roman law has confused this branch of law too long. It
is time to get back to the statute.”23 The court in Wingham and
subsequent cases have proceeded to interpret the provisions of
the Wills Act 1837 literally.24
1. “Soldiers”
The word soldier has long been given a wide definition. It appears
20
21
22
23
24
See above, n 6 at 184, 187.
Clive V Margrave-Jones, Mellows: The Law of Succession (5th ed, 1993)
at 82 para 7.4; see above, n 3 at 176.
[1949] P 187 at 195, per Denning LJ.
Ibid; cf Bailey, see above, n 19 at 55.
Prime, see above, n 13.
178 Singapore Law Review (1994)
that the word encompasses any person working as a soldier, and
not just members of the official armed forces. In the Goods
of Donaldson25 held that a soldier employed by the East India
Company was entitled to the privilege. In Wingham,26 in addition
to army soldiers, the word was held to include persons undergoing
military training, members of forces who work both at their
jobs and man defences (a local equivalent would be members
of the Singapore Joint Civil Defence Forces), and auxiliary per-
sonnel serving with armed forces such as doctors, nurses and
chaplains.27 The New South Wales Court of Appeal went even
further in Re White’s Application.28 In that case, a British subject
domiciled in New South Wales was employed during World War II
by the United States Army as a civilian engineer. He was issued
with papers which showed he had a status equivalent to that
of a major in the United States Army, and that in the event of
capture he was entitled to be treated as an officer prisoner-of-war.
The court held he was entitled to make a privileged will.
2. “Actual Military Service”
It was once thought that a soldier on actual military service
was in the same position as a Roman soldier in expeditione.29
He or she had to be either serving overseas in a campaign, or be
mobilised and about to serve overseas.30 This idea was exploded
25
26
27
28
29
30
(1840) 2 Curt 386, 163 ER 448.
See above, n 22 at 196.
See also In the Goods of Stanley [1916] P 192 (nurse); In the Goods of
Taylor [1933] IR 709 (surgeon).
[1975] 2 NSWLR 125.
Drummond v Parish, see above, n 9, applied by White v Repton (1844)
3 Curt 818, 163 ER 912 and In the Goods of Hill (1845) 1 Rob Eccl 276,
163 ER 1038. See above, n 15 and 16, and accompanying text.
In the Goods of Hiscock [1901] P 78 (soldier in barracks under orders);
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by Wingham’s case. In Winghatn, a soldier was on operational
duties as a trainee pilot in Saskatchewan, Canada, during World
War II. Saskatchewan was only a day’s flying from the enemy.
During this time he wrote an informal will leaving his property to
the plaintiffs. But after becoming a pilot instructor, he was injured
in an aircraft accident and died in hospital. Both Bucknill LJ
and Cohen LJJ felt that since the deceased testator was liable at
any time to be ordered to proceed to some area to take part in
active warfare, he was in “actual military service”.31 Bucknill LJ
went on to define the phrase broadly as “military service that is
directly concerned with operations in a war which is or has been
in progress or is imminent”.32 No actual declaration of war is
necessary to invoke the privilege.
Denning LJ’s formulation was similar,33 and he added that
this would include all kinds of people whether “in the field or in
barracks, in billets or sleeping at home. It includes them although
they may be captured by the enemy or interned by neutrals”.
But he went further by commenting:
Doubtful cases may arise in peacetime when a soldier is in, or
is about to be sent to, a disturbed area or an isolated post,
where he may be involved in military operations. As to these
cases, all I can say is that, in case of doubt, the serving soldier
should be given the benefit of the privilege.
However, he felt the privilege did not extend to officers on half-
pay, reservists, personnel in overseas territories not called up
31
32
33
Gattward v Knee [1902] P 99 (soldier mobilised); Re Stable, Dalrymple v
Campbell [1919] P 7 (soldier on orders to join army in France); Re Booth,
Booth v Booth [1926] P 118 (orders to proceed abroad received); In the
Estate of Rippon [1943] P 61 (member of Territorial Army ordered to rejoin
battery although not mobilised nor had war been declared).
See above, n 22 at 192, 194.
Ibid at 192.
Ibid at 196.
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for service, or members of armed forces serving at home or on
routine duty overseas in times of peace when military operations
were not imminent.
Later cases have continued to extend the meaning of “actual
military service”. Long after fighting has ceased, soldiers may
still be in actual military service as members of an army of occu-
pation.34 The term also includes quasi-military operations. In
Re Jones,35 the deceased was obliged by the conditions of his
service and in accordance with the discipline which prevailed in
his military unit to go out on patrol in Northern Ireland. He was
shot by a terrorist, but managed to tell an ambulance worker,
“If I don’t make it, make sure Anne gets all my stuff,” before he
passed away en route to the hospital. Anne was his fiancee. It was
held that this was active military service even though the enemy
was not a uniformed force engaged in regular warfare or even an
insurgent force organised along conventional military lines but a
“conjuration of clandestine assassins and arsonists”.36
Re Jones followed the Australian decision In the Will of Ander-
son,37 which involves the Malayan Emergency. The court decided
that “actual military service” does not imply a state of inter-
national conflict. It was sufficient for a soldier to be under orders
to proceed to Malaya, where an internal state of emergency had
been proclaimed on 18 June 1948, as a member of an Australian
contingent to aid the Malayan Government against Communist
rebels. In In re Berry (deed), Public Trustee v Berry38 a soldier
sent to South Korea as part of United Nations troops acting under
the United Nations Charter to repel an attack by North Korea
34
35
36
37
38
Re Limond [1915] 2 Ch 240; In the Estate of Colman [1958] 1 WLR 457.
[1981] 1 All ER 1.
Ibid at 5, 6.
(1958) 75 WN (NSW) 334.
[1955] NZLR 1003.
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was also held to be entitled to make a privileged will. The court
pointed out that “actual military service” did not just mean de
jure wars, but any form of “warlike operations”. These cases also
show that the likelihood that a privileged will may be needed
today in this part of the world is not remote.
3. “Mariner or Seaman”
”Mariner or seaman” has been held to mean all ranks of naval
forces39 and merchant seamen,40 including ancillary staff serving
on board a sailing vessel.41
4. “At Sea”
The phrase “at sea” has also been given a broad meaning. Apart
from its natural meaning it includes service on board a vessel
stationed permanently in a harbour,42 or lying in a river before
sailing.43 A person who makes a will on land during the course
of a voyage44 has the privilege, and so does a person who is under
39
40
41
42
43
44
Earl of Euston v Lord Henry Seymour (1802) (admiral), cited in In the
Goods of Hayes (1839) 2 Curt 338, 163 ER 431 (purser); In the Goods of
Saunders (1865) LR 1 P & D 16 (surgeon); In the Goods of Rae (1891)
27 LR (Ireland) 116 (surgeon); In the Estate of Yates [1919] P 93 (lieutenant).
Morrell v Morrell (1827) 1 Hagg Ecc 51, 162 ER 503; In the Goods of
Milligan (1849) 2 Rob Ecc 108, 163 ER 1258; In the Goods of Parker (1859)
2 Sw & T 375, 164 ER 1041.
In the Estate of Knibbs, Flay v Trueman [1962] 2 All ER 829 (barman on
a liner); In the Goods of Hale [1915] 2 IR 362 (typist on a ship).
In the Goods of M‘Murdo (1868) LR 1 P & D 540.
In the Goods of Austen (1853) 2 Rob Ecc 611, 163 ER 1431; In the Goods
of Patterson (1898) 79 LT 123; cf Hodson v Barnes (1926) 43 TLR 71 (pilot
on canal who lived ashore not in expeditione).
In the Goods of Lay (1840) 2 Curt 375, 163 ER 444. This case was dis-
tinguished in In the Goods of Corby (1854) 18 Jurist 634 (ship in port held
not to be “at sea”).
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orders to join a ship.45 Re Rapely’s Estate, Rapely v Rapely46
establishes that sailors are considered “at sea” in these situations:
i. When serving or employed in naval or merchant marine
service regarded as sea service. The nature of the service
is immaterial.
ii. When they are serving on a ship or are on long-shore leave
home, if they are members of a particular ship’s company.
iii. When they are already under orders to join another ship
in a fleet, if they are not members of a particular ship’s
company but have been employed by the owners of a fleet
of ships and have been discharged from one ship.
However the privilege does not apply to people who are under
orders to join a ship for short periods at a time while living and
working from home, such as the captain who ran a ferry across
the English Channel in Barnard v Birch.47
Such wide interpretations of the English equivalent of s 26(1)
mean that people who are not in life-threatening situations, or
actually have reasonable access to legal advice, are able to make
privileged wills. Ignoring the original reasons behind the rule
makes a nonsense of it.48
B. Rules of Revocation
Re Gossage, Wood v Gossage49 establishes that an informal letter
or act made while a person is privileged which expresses an in-
tention to revoke a previous will (whether properly-executed or
45
46
47
48
In the Goods of Newland [1952] P 71; In the Goods of Wilson [1952]
P 92, [1952] 1 All ER 852.
[1983] 3 All ER 248, [1983] 1 WLR 1069.
[1919] 2 IR 404.
Davey, see above, n 9 at 71: “ . . . [O]nce the original reason is divorced
from the actual wording of the statutory privilege it is difficult to see any
justification for the privilege as enacted.”; Hutley, see above, n 9 at 119:
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informal) effectively revokes it.50 Although a testator loses the
privilege of making informal wills after returning to civilian life,
this does not revoke any informal will made while the privilege
existed: Re Coleman.51
Unfortunately, these rules make it possible for privileged test-
ators to dispose of their property “by a chance remark, or by a
letter written in a temporary fit of anger”,52 revoking any formal
wills created previously. A testator’s long-forgotten privileged will
may also turn out to be effective: in In re Booth,53 a privileged
will made in 1881 was admitted to probate 45 years later in 1926.
C. Possibility of Fraud
The lack of formalities required for privileged wills facilitates
fraud.54 As D C Potter put it:
49
50
51
52
53
54
“ . . . [T]he limits upon the Roman privilege made it a more rational institu-
tion than our privileged will.”
[1921] P 194 (CA).
In Mellows, see above, n 21 at 88 para 7.25, the author finds an apparent
inconsistency between the English provisions dealing with revocation of wills
and privileged wills (in pari materia with s 14 and 26 of the Singapore Wills
Act respectively). It is submitted that no contradiction exists. Section 14 states
inter alia that a will may be revoked by “another will or codicil executed
in the manner by this Act required, or by some writing declaring an intention
to revoke it, and executed in the manner in which a will is by this Act
required to be executed”. While the italicized phrases might mean that any
new will or writing declaring an intention to revoke must be executed in
accordance with the formalities required by s 5, they might just as well refer
to s 26 with the result that no formalities for revocation are needed for
privileged testators.
[1920] 2 IR 332.
See above, n 6 at 190. Also Hutley, see above, n 9 at 119 col 2; see above,
n 3 at 178.
[1926] P 118.
R D Mackay, “When is a soldier privileged?” (1981) 131 NLJ 659 at 659
col 1.
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. . . [I]t will be open to anyone brazen enough to be undeterred
by the risk, to assert that the deceased once made a verbal will
in his favour; or a will on a scrap of paper, since lost; and
this will be possible even where the deceased made a solemn will
before entering the uniformed force.55
Several people might also collude in defrauding a testator’s estate.
A defrauder might pay an accomplice to falsely testify that the
deceased testator created a privileged will leaving property to
the defrauder.
IV. WHY WE SHOULD KEEP THE PRIVILEGE
For these reasons many commentators have called for privileged
wills to be abolished.56 However there are convincing grounds
for retaining the privilege.
A. Lack of Knowledge in Will-Making
In days past most of the population, including soldiers and sailors,
were poorly educated and lacked the knowledge and skill required
to make wills.57 Today the general level of education and literacy
in society is high, and soldiers have ample opportunity to make
formal wills while undergoing training.58 It has therefore been
suggested that the right to create is privileged wills is no longer
necessary.
But people in jurisdictions such as Australia and the United
Kingdom generally tend to be more aware of their legal rights
55
56
57
58
See above, n 6 at 190.
Bailey, see above, n 19 at 58-59; Davey, see above, n 9 at 71-72; Hutley, see
above, n 9 at 120 col 1; see above, n 3 at 179; Note (1949) 65 LQR 6 at 7.
Contra n 54 at 1109 col 3.
See above, n 3 at 177; see above, n 6 at 184.
Note, see above, n 56 at 7.
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than their Singapore counterparts. Soldiers in particular are well-
informed of their legal rights by military authorities, and may even
be more knowledgeable than civilians.59 For instance, a recruit
in the Australian Defence Force has access to legal officers who
provide general advice about the need to make wills and assist in
drafting them. The will is then held in safe custody until the
soldier’s discharge.60 Legal advice is also available before and
after moving into a combat zone.61 The situation in Singapore
is different. No such arrangements exist, so there is probably a
significant number of ordinary soldiers who are unaware of how
to create a formal will. Although the Ministry of Defence does
provide a Will Preparation Service run by volunteer lawyers, it is
not available to full-time national servicemen, operationally-ready
national servicemen (formerly called reservists) or civilian staff,
but only to regular uniformed servicemen and women.62 These
service personnel are also expected to appreciate the importance
of will-making and to avail themselves of the service as there
is as yet no policy or directive that requires military authorities
to advise them to execute formal wills, or of their capacity to
make privileged wills, before embarking on tours of duty such as
United Nations peacekeeping missions.63 Therefore the privilege
is still needed to protect personnel who have not executed a formal
will but are in circumstances of danger without legal advice.
59
60
61
62
63
See above, n 54 at 659 col 1.
NSW Law Reform Commission, Community Law Reform Program Eighth
Report: Wills – execution and revocation (LRC 47, 1986) at 147 para 11.25.
See above, n 3 at 177.
Pioneer: Magazine of the Singapore Armed Forces (April 1994, issue 198)
at 28.
This is based on a letter (reference MINDEF 4-4/26-11-1 dated 5 November
1993) and oral clarifications made on 16 November 1993 by the Ministry
of Defence in response to the writer’s queries.
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B. Effecting the Testator’s Wishes
It has been suggested that it does not matter if a testator dies
without making a will, since legislation dealing with intestacy and
provision for the family64 will ensure that family members will be
cared for.65 However this overlooks the most important reason
for a will: to give effect to testators’ wishes. They may want to
leave their real property and possessions to a fiancee, trusted
friend or charity instead of to family members, or to bequeath
certain personal effects of sentimental value to specific persons.
For a will to be properly executed, at least two witnesses are
required.66 But testators in life-threatening circumstances may
find themselves with only one witness present. In such cases, a
privileged will is the only way the testator’s wishes can be made
known.
C. Age of Majority
Formerly, privileged wills were needed because a large proportion
of soldiers and sailors were minors and lacked the capacity to
make formal wills even though they were engaged in the defence
of their country. In Australia and the United Kingdom the general
age of majority has been lowered by statute from 21 to 18. Thus,
the argument goes, the special privilege is no longer needed since
testators who are under 21 can now make valid wills.67
This argument is not applicable to Singapore. As no law has
ever been passed to lower the age of majority, it remains at the
64
65
66
67
Intestate Succession Act, Cap 146, 1985 Rev Ed; Inheritance (Family Pro-
vision) Act, Cap 138, 1985 Rev Ed.
Cole, see above, n 9 at 190.
Section 5(2) of the Wills Act, Cap 352, 1985 Rev Ed.
See above, n 60 at 146 para 11.22; see above, n 3 at 177.
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common law age of 21.68 In fact, the Wills Act states that the age
of majority for the purpose of making a valid will is 21,69 and
s 26(1) is specifically extended to soldiers and sailors under the
age of 21. However, most men are enlisted for full-time national
service at the age of 18.70
68
69
70
During the 9th to 11th centuries, 15 was the general age of majority in
Britain and Northern Europe as children were considered adults when they
were capable of farming work. By the time of the Magna Carta (1215),
the age of majority had been raised to 21. There is strong authority to
suggest that 21 was regarded as the age when men were able to wear a heavy
suit of armour and lift a lance or sword at the same time, the role of the
mounted knight having gained in importance during the time of the Norman
Conquest (1066). Later on, 21 became the universal age of majority for
all classes of subjects: Report on the Committee on the Age of Majority
(Cmnd 3342, 1967) at 20-23 paras 36-50.
There used to be some doubt about the age of majority in Singapore.
Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd v Ko Teck Kin (widow) [1982] 2 MLJ xcviii
held that s 1 of the UK Family Law Reform Act 1969 (c 46) which reduced
the age of majority in the United Kingdom from 21 to 18 was applicable
in Singapore through s 5(1) of the Civil Law Act, Cap 43, 1985 Rev Ed. This
was tacitly upheld on appeal by the Chief Justice. However, Ko Teck Kin
was not considered in Bank of India v Rai Bahadur Singh [1994] 1 SLR
328 and must now be taken to have been impliedly overruled by it. The Court
of Appeal in Rai Bahadur Singh agreed with the High Court decision ([1993]
1 SLR 634) that whether minors are of full age or not is a question of legal
status and not mercantile law. Hence s 5(1) of the Civil Law Act is irrelevant,
and the UK Family Law Reform Act 1969 is inapplicable to Singapore. The
age of majority is governed by the common law as permanently received
in Singapore by the Second Charter of Justice 1826, and is therefore 21 (see
Herbert v Turball (1633) 1 Keb 590, 83 ER 1129; Sir Robert Howard’s Case
(1699) 2 Salk 625, 91 ER 528; Anon (1704) 1 Salk 44, 91 ER 44; Fitz-Hugh
v Dennington (1704) 6 Mod 259, 87 ER 1005). The matter has now been
put beyond dispute by the Application of English Law Act, Cap 7A, 1994
Ed. Section 6(1) of the Act repealed s 5 of the Civil Law Act, while s 4(l)(a)
made only those English Acts listed in the First Schedule applicable in
Singapore. The UK Family Law Reform Act 1969 was not listed.
Section 4 of the Wills Act, Cap 352, 1985 Rev Ed.
Men not under the age of 18 who are subject to the Enlistment Act, Cap 93,
1985 Rev Ed are placed under a duty by s 10 to report for enlistment if
required by proper authority.
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V. A PLACE FOR THE PRIVILEGED WILL
Present inconsistencies in the law relating to privileged wills can
be eliminated by redefining s 26 of the Wills Act so that it accords
with the rationale underlying privileged wills.
Imminent risk of death. The section should be amended to
define the privilege by the circumstances in which individuals are
placed.71 Testators should only be allowed to create privileged
wills if they find themselves at imminent risk of death.72 Such an
imminent risk could be considered present if testators reasonably
contemplate death occurring within the immediate future, and
from some impending reason known to them.73 A subjective and
irrational fear of death sometime in the future will not do.
Redefining the privilege in this way means that it should no
longer be confined to just members of the army, navy and airforce,
but should extend to people of other vocations such as police
officers, firefighters and bomb disposal personnel. This is more
consistent with the rationale behind privileged wills.
Situations of imminent risk of death should be narrowly defined
and developed on an incremental basis by courts. People should
be considered to be at imminent risk of death only when actually
engaged in dangerous work as part of their occupation. For in-
stance, it should not be enough for the crew of an aircraft to
be airborne. The privilege should apply only if the aircraft is
experiencing engine trouble, caught in a violent storm, or involved
in a hijacking. Similarly, a firefighter battling a dangerous fire
71
72
73
This suggestion is also proposed in Mellows, see above, n 21 at 90 paras
7.30-7.31.
See above, n 16 at 673 col 3, where Cole suggests clarifying some of the
problems raised by Wingham by restricting privileged wills to the Roman
law concept of in expeditione.
This requirement has been applied in the context of a donatio mortis causa:
see Re Craven’s Estate, Lloyd’s Bank v Cockburn (No 1) [1937] Ch 423,
[1937] 3 All ER 33.
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and a police officer in actual pursuit of a dangerous criminal
would have the privilege, but not if they were merely on duty
in the station. People who are seriously injured as a result of a
hazardous profession and who are at a real risk of dying should
also be privileged. But testators who in reality are not isolated
from civilian life and are able to seek proper advice should be
denied the privilege. An example would be a soldier posted during
wartime to an operational headquarters or training facility within
a populated area away from the combat zone.
The privilege should only last as long as imminent risk of
death remains. Once the risk disappears, the privilege should no
longer be exercisable.74 For instance, a ship’s crew should have
the privilege while a severe storm rages, but once it dies down
and the ship is out of danger the privilege should cease.
Automatic revocation. Any privileged will or act of revoca-
tion should be deemed revoked once the imminent risk of death
ceases,75 or one year after its creation,76 whichever comes sooner.
For example, any privileged will created by a person seriously
injured and hospitalised as a result of engaging in a risky vocation
should be considered of no effect once his or her condition is
stable and intensive care is no longer required. Such a measure
would avoid the problem of long-forgotten wills surfacing later
74
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76
This is similar to a donatio mortis causa: “ . . . [I]f the donor does not die
then the gift is not to take effect and the donor is to have back the subject
matter of the gift.”: see above, n 73 at 426.
C/Hutley, see above, n 9 at 119 col 1: “ . . . [W]hy should an informal will
not be regarded, as it appears to have been in Roman Law, as a tentative
will which ceased to be effective unless formally confirmed after the soldier
returned from the campaign?”
Commentators have suggested that this Roman rule can be used to limit
the effect of privileged wills: see above, n 3 at 180; Mellows, see above,
n 21 at 90 para 7.30. At Roman law, a privileged will only remained valid
for one year after the testator was honourably discharged from the army:
The Institutes of Justinian, see above, n 4 at 175 para 3.
190 Singapore Law Review (1994)
to plague the deceased testator’s family and the court. It would
also compel privileged testators to execute proper wills.
Safeguards against fraud. The fundamental problem with priv-
ileged wills is that they reintroduce the problems which the Wills
Act was supposed to cure. The lack of formalities needed to create
them creates possibilities for uncertainty, or worse still, fraud.
But since there still remains a role for privileged wills, the question
is not whether we should allow them, but where a balance should
be struck. Ideally, any person in a situation of imminent risk of
death should be allowed to exercise the privilege. But an enlarge-
ment of the privilege in such an indeterminate manner would
probably lead to overwhelming litigation and deception.
Accordingly, it might be advisable to narrow the scope of the
privilege. This would dilute the effect of the privilege as a form
of protection for testators in dangerous situations but reduce the
accompanying difficulties. As a start, we might limit the exercise
of the privilege to those people engaging in specified risky occupa-
tions deemed beneficial to society, such as the crews of aircraft
and sea-going vessels, firefighters, military and quasi-military
personnel (eg civil defence personnel), police and quasi-police
officers (eg narcotics officers), and people involved in disaster
relief and rescue work (eg bomb disposal squads). Such occupa-
tions could be listed in a schedule to the Wills Act amendable
as circumstances require by Parliament or perhaps a designated
Minister.
If we could be certain there would be no deceit, a testator’s
will made orally and witnessed by a single person might be con-
sidered a sufficient valid disposition of his or her property. But
since we cannot be sure of this, other legal safeguards which might
be employed include (1) allowing oral privileged wills, but requiring
at least the presence of two witnesses, one of whom is not a
beneficiary; or (2) not requiring writing, but barring claims by all
beneficiaries who are also witnesses to the execution of the privil-
eged will. It is submitted that either of these precautions should
suffice, but if additional protection is deemed necessary, we might
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also (3) require all privileged wills to be in writing77 but dispense
with the signatures of the testator and witnesses; (4) require all
privileged wills to be in the testator’s own handwriting, though
it need not be signed by the testator or any witnesses; or (5) if a
formal will is found to be extant, hold the privileged will to be
of no effect to the extent of the inconsistency. Introducing these
requirements would greatly weaken the value of the privileged will
but might provide better precautions against fraud.
The law of privileged wills has been considered by law re-
form commissions of several jurisdictions. In Australia, the New
South Wales Law Commission recommended that no class of
persons should have the status of being privileged testators.78 The
Law Reform Commission of British Columbia in Canada re-
commended removing the privilege with reference to adult soldiers
and sailors.79 The United States’ Uniform Probate Code, which
individual states can adopt, contains no provision for privileged
wills.80
Conversely, the Queensland Law Reform Commission doubted
the value of these special privileges but felt the privilege should be
preserved with only minor statutory amendments.81 In Tasmania
the Law Reform Commission, after having referred in its working
paper to possible reform to privileged wills, made no recommenda-
tions in its report.82 The UK Law Reform Committee thought on
balance that there was a case for retaining the privilege in its
77
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82
Cole, see above, n 9 at 189; Hutley, see above, n 9 at 120 col 1; see above,
n 3 at 180.
See above, n 60 at 149 para 11.36.
See above, n 3 at 179.
Ibid.
Report on The Law Relating to Succession (QRLC 22) at 11. See above,
n 3 at 179.
Report on Reform on the Law of Wills, Report No 35 (1983) at 12. See
above, n 3 at 179.
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present form and recommended neither abolition nor modifi-
cation.83 And the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong in
considering an equivalent provision recommended only minor
changes to modernise the language used.84 In not recommending
to abolish the privilege, these law reform commissions recognise
that privileged wills still play a role in the law of succession.
The modifications to s 26 of the Wills Act proposed above
are not so much a widening of the privilege as a refinement. If
adopted, they would ensure that the privilege of making informal
wills is accorded only in appropriate situations to people who
truly require it. And recent disasters, acts of terrorism and wars
show that such situations are not unlikely to occur. The need for
privileged wills is evident at a time when Singapore is increasing
its involvement in international affairs by sending members of
its police and armed forces on United Nations observer and peace-
keeping missions. None of this diminishes the importance of
formal will-making; in fact, people in high-risk occupations should
be counselled both on the importance of creating formal wills
and their capacity to make privileged ones. It would be ideal if
the privileged will were never used, but it is better to keep it in
our statute books so that it can be invoked in deserving cases.
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84
Law Reform Commission 22nd Report: The making and revocation of wills
(Cmnd 7902, 1980) at para 2.21.
Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Report on the Law of Wills,
Intestate Succession and Provision for Deceased Persons’ Families and
Dependants (Topic 15, 1990) at 16 para 3.7.
